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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF' UTAH
---00000---

COX CONSTRUCTIOU COMPANY,
INC.,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15499

STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant and
Appellant.
---00000---

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
---00000---

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the propriety of an award of
interest by the Court on three separate amounts which were
d,etermined to be due and owing Respondent and which had
been paid by Appellant and accepted by Respondent without
the mention of interest.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondent filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking an award of interest on three separate amounts
previously determined to be due and owing Respondent
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Appellants contention in opposition to Respondent's motion
was that the amounts paid constituted an accord and satisfaction.

The trial Court, Judge Marcellus K. Snow, presiding

granted partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent and
against Appellant for the sum of $21,532.24 which was enterec
of record on the 30th day of August, 1977.

Defendant-Appel-

lant State Road Commission now known as the Utah Department
of Transportation appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the partial summary
judgment and a judgment denying Respondents claim for
interest.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about January 29, 1971 the parties entered
into an arbitration agreement which agreement involved
claims for additional payment allegedly due Respondent on
nine separate highways projects.

(Exhibit 1 to affidavit

in support of motion for partial summary judgment dated
November 19, 1976.)

The second paragraph of said agreement

obligates Respondent to file its claims with full.· document<
tion within 90 days from the receipt of project documents
which were made available to Respondent at the time the agr1
ment was consummated.
Pursuant to the arbitration agreement part of the
dispute between the parties on Project FLH-42(6) second

-
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contract and S-037(4) first contract, Poison Springs Wash
to Trachyte Junction was decided by the arbitration panel
on December 28, 1972 (Exhibit 5 to affidavit in Support of
motion for partial summary judgment).

The panel awarded

the sum of $1,745 and the parties agreed to the payment of
additional sums which together totaled $23,279.98.

(See Ex-

hibit A attached to affidavit of Don R. Strong in opposition to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment dated
December, 1976.)

Said Exhibit A just referred to is a letter

from Respondent's counsel and makes no reference to interest
on the agreed amounts.
March 19, 1973.

The amount referred to was paid

The final estimate invoice was submitted

on said project on May 20, 1969.

(Affidavit in Support of

motion -for partial summary judgment.)
The claims on the project designated as FLH 42(6)
third contract and s-0370(4) second contract, Hanksville to
Poison Springs Wash were settled by stipulation dated the
15th day of February, 1974 for the total sum of $15,134.47,
and said sum was paid March 21, 1974.

(See paragraph 8 of

affidavit in support of motion for partial summary j·udgment
and Exhibit 3 attached thereto.)

No provision for interest

is made or referred to in the stipulation.
The claims of Project I-IG-15-8(26) 357 and F-FG001-8(4), North Perry to US-30-S 14th South Street to I-15
and US-30 were settled by stipulation between the parties

-
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on July 20, 1974.

The total amount agreed upon was

$28,808.72, and said sum was paid July 22, 1974.
estimate invoice was submitted October S, 1967.

The final
Again no

reference is made in the stiputlation to interest.

(See

affidavit in support of motion for partial summary judgment,
paragraph 8 and Exhibit 2.)
The stipulations referred to were prepared by
counsel for Respondent.

(See letter dated July 5, 1974

signed by John F. Piercey attached to affidavit of Leland
D. Ford attached to motion for summary judgment denying interest on amounts paid under stipulation, etc.)
All three of the projects referred to were
settled for less than the original claimed amounts.

(See

affidavits of Leland D. Ford and Don R. Strong in opposition
to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.)
The original arbitration agreement does reserve
all questions of law to be heard by a District Judge of the
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County.

(EighV

paragraph of arbitration agreement which is Exhibit 1 to affidavit in support of motion for summary

ju~gment)

.

None of

the stipulations or other documents connected with these thre
projects reserve the question of interest payment.

Responde

motion for partial summary judgment on the three projects ii
question was filed in November, 1976 which is 28 months afte
the last project had apparently been settled.

-
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During the time that the stipulations were being
arrived at and prior thereto it was mutually understood by
counsel for the respective parties that interest on claims
of this nature was not paid by the state.

(See affidavits

of Leland D. Ford and Don R. Strong in oppostion to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment).

Respondent's

motion for partial summary judgment was filed on the 19th
day of November, 1976.

It was heard on the 27th day of July,

1977 and judgment entered on August 30, 1977.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STIPULATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
CONSTITUTE AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
The-general law on accord and satisfaction is expressed in 1 AmJur. 2d 330 (Sec. 33, Accord and Satisfaction)
wherein it is stated as follows:
Where a claim is unliquidated, or, if
liquidated, there is a bona fide doubt
or controversy exists as to whether anything is due, then an accord and satisfaction may be established and held binding, although there is payment of a sum
less than that claimed by the creditor, or
even a sum less than that which, on an
actual computation, might be found due to
the creditor. The consideration in the
settlement of such a claim lies in the
mutual concessions of the parties, ••• "
(Citing among other cases the case of Ralph
A. Badger & co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan
Association, 94 U. 97, 75 P.2d 669.)
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It is further stated in 1 AmJur. 2d at page 348
under section 52 dealing with the effect of accord and satis
faction as follows:
If the accord constitutes a binding contract and it is fully performed, the performance satisfies the original claim and
operates as a final bar to the demand or
subject matter of the agreement for accord
and satisfaction.
(Citing several cases
along with the following:
The voluntary settlement of differences between parties in respect of
their rights, where all have the same
knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge concerning the circumstances and
there are no frauds, misrepresentations,
concealments, or other misleading incidents, must stand and be enforced, although the settlement made by the
parties in their agreement might not
be that which the court could have
decreed had the controversy been
brought before it for decision. Young
v. Stephenson, 82 Okla. 239, 200 P. 225,
24 A.L.R. 978, emphasis supplied.)
Appellant submits that the emphasized statement
above exactly fits the facts of this matter.

There was a

bona fide accord between the parties on the three cases invalved as to sums to be paid in satisfaction of
claims.

Respondent'~

The sums upon which accord was reached were all

paid, thus performing the accord.
settlement" by the parties.

This was a "voluntary

In light of the recent pro-

nouncements of the Utah Supreme Court regarding the payment
of interest on claims of this nature in the cases of

~

Pipeline-corporation v. V'7hite Superior Co., 546 P.2 885 and
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Jack B. Parson Company vs. State of Utah, 552 P.2 107,
the accord conceivably "might not be that which the Court
would have decreed had the controversy been brought before
it for decision."

It is submitted that this Court should

refuse to upset the accord and satisfaction which the
parties freely entered into by an award of interest in addition to the agreed settlement figure.
The following statement from the Badger case,
supra, seems to Appellant to be dispositive:
••. In the case last cited (Browning v.
Equitable Life Assn. Soc. of U.S., 72
P.2d 1960) we said: An accord is an
agreement between parties, one to give
or perform, the other to receive or accept, such agreed payment or performance
in satisfaction of a claim. The 'satisfaction' is the consWTl!llation of such agree- ment~ Settlement of an unliquidated or
disputed claim where the parties are apart
in good faith presents such consideration •.••
POINT II
WHEN THE STIPULATIONS AT ISSUE WERE
ENTERED INTO THE PARTIES BELIEVED THAT
THE STATE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PAY
INTEREST AND INTEREST SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SHOULD
BE TERMINATED APRIL 29, 1971.
The recent cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court
in Uinta Pipeline Corporation v.· White Superior and Jack B.
Parson construction Company vs. State of Utah, supra, have
established the requirement by the State to pay interest on

- 7 -
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unliquidated claims, such as the three claims which were
settled by stipulation, and which form the basis of Respondent's motion for partial sununary judgment.

At the time

the three stipulations which are at issue were entered into
it was the mutual understanding of counsel for both parties
that the State of Utah was not obligated to pay interest
on claims of this nature.

Respondent well knows that the

State had traditionally not paid interest on claims of
this nature.

Counsel for the parties had discussed this

on numerous occasions and the assertion of Appellant's
counsel that this was in fact the understanding of Respondent's counsel is unchallenged.

(See affidavits of Leland

D. Ford and Don R. Strong in opposition to plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment.)

The fact that this

may have been erroneous should not affect the settlements
arrived at.

The settlements were arrived at with the under-

standing that interest was not payable and may or may not
have been influenced as to amount by that now apparent
erroneous conclusion.

To allow the recovery of interest

at this point would work an injustice and result in a windfall to Respondent.
It should be further pointed out that the claims
were all filed well beyond the 90-day provision set forth

in the stipulation entered into between the parties (Exhibit
1 to the-a.ffidavit of Cecil Cox in support of plaintiff's
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motion for summary judgment.)

The timeliness of the 90-

day provision while important in the ultimate resolution
of the claims was not considered critical by Appellant
until the reality of the payment of interest was decided
by the recent decisions of this Court in Uinta Pipeline and
Jack B. Parson, supra.

By Respondent's failure to file its

claim within the 90-day period it forces Appellant to pay
increased interest by the simple device of delaying the
filing of claims.

As long as interest was not being paid

the urgency of enforcing the 90-day provision was not
apparent to Appellant.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that if the
Court in fact deems that interest must be paid by Appellant,
then it is respectfully submitted that that interest requirement should terminate 90 days from the date of the execution
of the agreement between the parties to arbitrate the various
claims.

Respondent has in fact been delinquent since that

date in the filing if its claims and should not profit because of its own delinquency when that delinquency is not
in any way attributable to Appellant.

The 90-day period

from the date of the original agreement would end April 29,
1971, and it is respectfully submitted that no interest
should be allowed Respondent for any reason beyond said date
unless its submission to the arbitration panel was made within the 90-day period.
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POINT III
IF THE STIPULATIONS AT ISSUE CREATE AN
AMBIGUITY THEY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AGAINST
RESPONDENT SINCE THEY WERE DRAFTED
BY RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL.
Appellant submits that if the Court is of the
opinion that by failing to specifically refer to interest
the stipulations are ambiguous, then it is respectfully
submitted by Appellant that they should be construed
against Respondent since all three stipulations were draftee
by Respondent's counsel.
This Court has recently spoken on this point in
the case of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Midwest Realty &
Finance, Inc., a 1975 case found at 544 P.2d 882.

At page

885 the Court makes this statement:
••• In dealing with a document which is
ambiguous or uncertain, the general rule
is that it should be construed strictly
against the party who wrote it (Midwest)
and favorably to the other party against
whom it is envoked (Wells Fargo). Further,
when a document is of that character, the
trial court can take extraneous evidence
and look to the total circumstances to determine what the parties should reasonably
be deemed to have understood thereby. These
principles are to be considered together with
this further proposition: That where there
was dispute, it is the prerogative of the
trial court to determine whose evidence he
will believe.
It is further submitted by Appellant that when th1
stipulations were entered into they clearly were intended ti
complete-ly resolve the issues between the parties as to the

-
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claims covered by the stipulations.

This is apparent from

the letter dated July 5, 1974 from Respondent's counsel to
Appellant's counsel which accompanied the stipulation between the parties on the North Perry to U.S. 30-S or Brigham
City claim.

That letter reads as follows (omitting heading

and reference line) :
Dear Lee:
I believe the enclosed stipulation sets
forth our settlement on the Brigham City
claim.
If you have any changes or suggestions,
please call me. If it meets with your approval,
please sign and return the original and one
copy to me.
Thank you for your assistance.
Very truly yours,
John F. Piercey
Note the use of the word "settlement."

There was no question

of the intent of the parties in July of 1974 that the entire
matter was being "settled" by the agreement to pay the
sum as set forth in that document.

Likewise for the two

other projects.
This Court has in the recent case of Big Butte Ranch,
Inc. vs. Marjorie R. Holm, et al.

(Case No. 14630 decided

October 3, 1977) stated the following:
.•• to ascertain the meaning of the agreements,
the Court should first examine the language
of the instruments and accord to it the
weight and effect which it may show was intended and if the meaning is ambiguous or
uncertain then consider parol evidence of
the parties' intentions. (citing Mathis v.
Madsen, 1 u 246, 261 P.2 952 •••
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Using this approach, if the agreement and the letter are
fairly interpreted, the payment of interest should not
be allowed.

On the other hand, if they are deemed to be

ambiguous then the parol evidence is that it was understood by counsel for the parties that interest was not in
the contemplation of the parties due on the agreed settlemetn amounts.
According to the following language from the Lake v.
Hermes Associates, 552 P.2 126 (1976) it is proper for
this Court to make its own interpretation of the documents
in question.

In the cited case this Court said the followir

••. However, in a case of this nature, where
the resolution of the controversy depends upon
the meaning to be given documents, the trial
court is in no more favored position and is
no better able to determine the meaning of
such documents than is this Court. Therefore, as to such an issue, those presumptions
do not apply. (citing Burns V. Skopstad, 69
Idaho 227, 206 P.2d 765 (1949)).
It is therefore clear that this Court can examine the documents which create the dispute and the circumstances and
events leading up to the execution of the documents and
examine the language to determine whether or not they were
intended to be full and complete payment to respondent as
urged to Appellant.

If they are ambiguous it is submitted

that the ambiguity should be resolved against Respondent.

- 12 -
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POINT IV
THE THREE STIPULATIONS BY THEIR TERMS
DO NOT REFER TO ANY RESERVATION INVOLVING
THE ORIGINAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
ON LEGAL QUESTIONS.
One of the Respondent's arguments is that all questions of law in dealings before the arbitration panel were
to be reserved for a determination by the Third District
Court.

Appellant submits that since all three stipulations

were entered into subsequent to that original stipulation
and since none of the three stipulations by their terms
make reference to the original arbitration

agreement re-

servations, as to legal questions that they are intended to
supersede said document insofar as the stipulations are
concerned with various individual projects.

They do not,

in fact, make any reservation for later determination
except a few factual disputes to be solved by reference
to the panel and as to the individual projects they supersede and replace the original agreement to arbitrate.
Since by their own terms there is not a provision for interest it is improper to insert same judicially.
POINT V
RESPONDENT'S RECEIPT OF PAYMENT AND SILENCE
IN DEMANDING THE PAYMENT OF INTEREST FOR
28 MONTHS SHOULD ESTOP RESPONDENT FROM
NOW ASSERTING ITS CLAIM FOR SAME.
The payments made on the three projects referred to
above by Appellant to Respondent occurred more than 28 months
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prior to the filing of the motion for partial summary judgment.

No request or demand for the payment of the accrued

interest on the amounts found to be due and owing was
ever made to Respondent from and after the dates of payment,
In the Big Butte Ranch, Inc. vs. Marjorie R. Holm,
et al. case, supra, this Court has stated the following:
••• The test of estoppel is objective in
nature as to what a reasonable person,
under the circumstances, might conclude
(citing Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Ut.
2d 4 7, 513 p. 2 41 7 ( 19 7 3) •••
It is respectfully submitted that silence by respondent over such an extended period is enough to raise an
estoppel, particularly when it is coupled with the written
stipulations and with the other communications which make
reference to the agreed amounts as "settlements" and when
no reference is madG to interest at any time.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment
of the trial court in awarding summary judgment against
appellant for the sum of $21,532.24 is erroneous.

It is

barred by the accord and satisfaction reached between the
parties which in each instance involving the three projects
referred to was in excess of 28 months prior to the filing
of a motion for partial summary judgment by respondent clai
ing interest on the agreed sums.
If the accord and satisfaction of the parties does
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not bar recovery then Appellant respectfully submits that
Respondent will reap a windfall based on a mutual mistake
by the parties and it is simply inequitable to allow Respondent to recover on that basis.
Appellant further submits that at the very least the
stipulations involved in the three cases were prepared by
Respondent's counsel and do not provide for interest nor do
they reserve that question for future determination.

The

original agreement to arbitrate the disputes proved for a
reservation of legal questions, but the stipulations supersede and replace the original agreement and if by their
failure to resolve the question of interest they are obviously arnbiguous.--The general rule and certainly the Utah rule
would resolve said ambiguity against the Respondent.
It is also apparent that Respondent has been in
default of the original agreement to arbitrate in that he
did not file his claim within the 90-day period specified
in the arbitration agreement and should not profit as a
result of his own lack of diligence.
Finally, Appellant also submits that the continued
silence of Respondent for a period in excess of 28 months
from the date upon which the last payment was made by Appellant to Respondent should estop Respondent from recovery of
any additional sum.
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment
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should be reversed by this Court and additionally that Respondent's motion for partial summary judgment should be
dismissed with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General

~~7ll

Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that two copies each of the
foregoing Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid
to John F. _Pie~cey, 72 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, Attorney for Respondent, this 12th day of
December, 1977.
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